1. What is information policy and how does
it relate to information technology?
2. What is government transparency?
3. What is information security?
4. How do governments in the Former Soviet
Union address information content?
5. Who manages the construction of the physical
network?
6. Are information policy laws really followed?
7. Is there in-country variation in information
policy as well as cross-national variation?
1. What is information policy and how does it relate to information technology?
Information policy includes direct and ancillary laws, decrees and other government declarations that address information ownership, collection and dissemination. In the Former Soviet Union, these questions are particularly acute. During the Soviet period, the state owned all data and controlled the flow of information. Consequently, citizens had limited access to information about government actions.
While information policy incorporates information technology, IT policies can be subdivided into three elements: information security, information content and the construction of physical information networks. The use of IT affects government transparency as well as individual civil liberties.
2. What is government transparency?
Government transparency, or the production and dissemination of information about the activities of elected and un-elected officials, is an important component in democratization and the development of civil society. Without access to information on government performance, citizens cannot actively participate in policy debates or hold officials accountable for their actions. The development of open information policies thus facilitates democratization.
The degree of government transparency in a country can be thought of as a continuum. On one end of the continuum, there is a completely open society with no restrictions to information flow from government to the citizenry. On the other end, there is a complete restriction of information flow; citizens have no information about government actions. Neither extreme is possible or even desirable to obtain. The Soviet Union was clearly located toward the more restrictive end of the continuum. An important question for the newly independent states to resolve is how far should they move toward the other extreme. A related question is how information technology can be used to promote transparency.
3. What is information security?
Information security incorporates a number of disparate concepts that are related to the protection of data and its sources. It includes the protection of sensitive government information from access by unauthorized individuals, damage or theft and the maintenance of the anonymity of information sources, particularly the identity of individuals. Information security has also touched on the preservation of state economic interests that are threatened by information flight abroad. The idea of information security has been at the center of government information policy both in Russia and Ukraine.
In both countries, the government has attempted to pass legislation requiring the installation of hardware in communication centers, like Internet Service Providers, to monitor information flow. In Russia, the government was successful in this effort. The System for Investigations and Field Operations (SORM) was incorporated into the law soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union. SORM has been opposed by many ISPs and civil rights organizations. The Moscow Libertarium has hosted much of the on-line debate about the system and its potential effects on civil rights.
In Ukraine, government attempts to introduce SORM have thus far been unsuccessful. In late 1999, a bill introduced in the Rada to put SORM in place failed. The primary reason for its failure was not SORM’s potential effect on free speech, but that the cost for its installation and maintenance was assigned to ISPs. Even the most loyal Ukrainian ISPs lobbied for its failure. Although efforts to incorporate monitoring hardware into communication centers by 1999 were unsuccessful, Ukrainian information policy is generally characterized by a focus on information security.
It is important to note that information security concerns and attempts to monitor communication are not limited to post-communist states. Western democracies also have systems in place to scan telephone conversations, e-mail and other forms of communication. The process by which these systems were introduced, their physical connection to the telecommunications network and the oversight mechanisms, however, vary from country to country.
4. How do governments in the Former Soviet Union address information content?
Central control of information and the mass media is generally considered to be a key characteristic of totalitarian states. While the most serious barriers to information production were lifted in the 1990s, different forms of censorship still remain.
There is substantial variation in censorship across the former Soviet Union. In Russia and Ukraine, there is no practical evidence of wide-ranging censorship. The distribution of some information is restricted for national security purposes, but there is debate about how far this should be extended. Information production is generally open, but certain topics are off limits.
Nevertheless, there have been official efforts to regulate the content of speech. In Ukraine, for example, the Presidential Decree “On the Development of Spirituality, Defense of Morals, and Formation of a Healthy Way of Life for Citizens” of April 1999 forbids the importation of violent and pornographic materials. While the law is widely broken, it implies that the government retains an interest in regulating the content of speech.
Outside of Russia and Ukraine, censorship is more acute. The closure of the Soros Foundation offices in Belarus and the actions of the Belarusan government point to more egregious violations of free speech than are found in Russia and Ukraine. According to Internews Network press releases, the government of Kazakhstan cut off access to the Eurasia site on November 4, 1999. This site, located in Russia, publishes materials that are critical of the Kazakh authorities. Although access was reestablished on November 9, 1999, the Kazakh government's actions illustrate an attempt to censor materials on the net.
Official efforts to censor the Internet are found elsewhere in the post-Soviet region as well. According to Reporters Without Borders, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are among the nations that most actively attempt to control Internet access.
5. Who manages the construction of the physical network?
Neither Russia nor Ukraine has a single entity that is responsible for the construction of the physical network. In both countries, government, academic institutions, private companies, international organizations and donor agencies participate in the creation of the telecommunications network that facilitates access to the Internet.
At the end of 1999, there was one fiber optic line in Ukraine that ran through Kyiv from the Rada (parliament) building to Kyiv Taras Shevchenko University. The government telephone service provider, Ukrtelekom, manages most wired communication and international lines. However, a number of Ukrainian ISPs have direct international access through partnerships with foreign companies. Russia generally has better quality telecommunications service than Ukraine, but is far behind Europe and North America regarding the state of the physical network.
6. Are information policy laws really followed?
An official in the Russian Ministry of Science and Technology suggested to me that I would be able to write a wonderful analysis about information policy and the Internet after my research was completed. However, the paper would only reflect information policy in theory. In practice, he said, laws are not followed in the Former Soviet Union.
While it is difficult to precisely assess the degree to which laws are broken, it is clear that much of information policy is currently only applied on paper. In my discussions with representatives of many ISPs in Russia and Ukraine, they indicated that government regulations have little or no effect on the way in which they conduct business. In Russia, ISP representatives said that while they were required to sign agreements regarding SORM, they have not experienced any practical consequences from this legislation. None of the representatives I encountered indicated that hardware was in place on their premises (although one said that he believed it was installed at a local telephone station).
Other laws and decrees are also clearly ignored. The Ukrainian Presidential Decree “On the Development of Spirituality, Defense of Morals, and Formation of a Healthy Way of Life for Citizens” of April 1999 is an example of laws that are not enforced. While the law indicates that the importation, production and distribution of “materials of a pornographic character and materials that propagandize the cult of violence and oppression” is illegal, magazines, videotapes, cds and web sites containing these materials were freely available in the country in fall 1999.
A single visit to Moscow’s huge Gorbushka (a weekend market for all kinds of products) demonstrates that laws protecting intellectual property are not strictly followed in the former USSR. Hundreds of vendors openly sell pirated software and music cds. The metro stations of Kyiv and a local radio market are also filled with similar vendors (I must note that one can also find similar vendors in New York City).
Despite the fact that citizens often do not adhere to the laws in place, legislation regarding information technology provides us with insight into government attitudes about overall information policy.
7. Is there in-country variation in information policy as well as cross-national variation?
In Russia, there is substantial variation in press freedom across the subjects of the federation. A recently published study attempts to empirically analyze press freedom in the units of the Russian Federation, but limits the analysis to print media. This oversight unfortunately undermines confidence in the results as it ignores radio, television and electronic media.
Despite its shortcomings, the study addresses an important concept in the study of information policy. Although governments create a national information policy, there can be variation among regional sub-units. Because Russia is a federation, the differences between national and local policies can be more acute than one finds in a unitary state like Ukraine.
Perhaps the greatest difference in information technology across sub-national units is not a difference in policy, however. Variation in on-line access and the division of the population into those with and those without access to electronic information also follows geographic boundaries. The capitals of both Russia and Ukraine have more reliable telecommunications services and a greater number of ISPs than the regions. More affluent citizens also tend to live in the capital and can afford to access electronic resources. While local ISPs continue to emerge in cities across the Former Soviet Union, Internet access is far more available in the largest urban centers.
Document posted 1/15/00